This project emerged from the above research on professions, and in particular from an understanding that, from the outset, a non-negligible portion of professional activity and the definition of the profession and professionals, especially in the legal context, relied on “honor” (“Kavod” in Hebrew). A systematic review of historical documents that I discovered reveals the extent to which Kavod played a central part in day-to-day life during the Mandate Era. This (collaborative) research also received funding from the Israel Science Foundation, and it led to a series of articles about the concept of honor during the Mandate era. The specific example of legal claims based on honor shed light on fundamental questions such as the freedom of expression, or law and emotions, among others (for example, “Workers’ Honor, Anger and Emotions in Mandate Palestine Informal Courts”), and as expected, on the historical aspect of honor in the professions (for example, “Medical Staff’s Honor in Mandate Palestine”).

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Eyal Katvan and Boaz Shnoor, “Workers’ Honor, Anger and Emotions in Mandate Palestine Informal Courts”, LAW, SOCIETY AND CULTURE (Special Issue on Emotions, Tel-Aviv University) (forthcoming 2020) (in Hebrew).  

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Eyal Katvan and Boaz Shnoor, “Medical Staff’s Honor in Mandate Palestine”, KOROTH (forthcoming 2020) (in Hebrew). 

 

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​Eyal Katvan and Boaz Shnoor, “Honor and Defamation in Israel – between three authorities”, MOZNEY MISHPAT (forthcoming 2020) (in Hebrew).

 

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Katvan E., (2010) Who is the Landlord? Quarantine and Medical Examinations for Immigrants at the Gates of Eretz-Israel (1918-1929), Korot 20, 37-61

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a. *Eyal Katvan and Boaz Shnoor, “Court’s Precious Time: Transparency, Honor and Judicial Scarce Resources”, (2017) Oñati Socio-Legal Series 7(4) 825

b.  Eyal Katvan and Boaz Shnoor, “A Perfect Façade?”: Transparency, Honor and Judicial Scarce Resources”, 26(1) International Journal of the Legal Profession, (2018) 143

English Abstract: While many judicial systems in the Western World are coping with a shortage of judges, the public is not always aware of the overload and its reasons. Our claim is that the reason for this, is the fact that the judicial system preferred to preserve an ideal image of the judiciary and control all information about it, rather than to publicize the judicial overload problem. In this paper, we aim to show that until recently, the issue of “judicial overload” was hidden from the public eye. We deal with the importance and advantageous of presenting the relevant facts to the public. We shall empirically show, that the judicial system has begun to legitimize the exposure of judicial overload to the public.

Spanish Abstract: Si bien es cierto que muchos sistemas judiciales del mundo occidental están lidiando con la escasez de jueces, también lo es que el público no siempre es consciente de la sobrecarga de trabajo y de sus razones. Nosotros afirmamos que la razón de ello es que el sistema judicial ha preferido preservar una imagen ideal de la judicatura y controlar toda la información acerca de ella antes que hacer público el problema de la sobrecarga de trabajo de los jueces. En este artículo, pretendemos mostrar que, hasta hace poco, la cuestión de la "sobrecarga de los jueces" ha permanecido oculta a ojos del público. Tratamos el tema de la importancia y la ventaja que supone presentar los hechos relevantes al público, y demostraremos empíricamente que el sistema judicial ha comenzado a aprobar la exposición de la sobrecarga judicial al público.

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Ben-Noon C., Shnoor B., Katvan E., (2015) Judges ‘Perception of Lawyers’ Behavior in Court, Hamishpat Law Journal 15(1), 11-49 (in Hebrew). 

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​Katvan E., Shnoor B., (2010) Between Civility and Reputation, Hamishpat 15, 71-110 (in Hebrew)

The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion, held that a lawyer is immune against defamation actions regarding all statements made during judicial proceedings. However, the court ruled that a lawyer may be subjected to disciplinary procedures by the Bar. The court’s ruling blurs the distinction between the ethical and disciplinary aspects of defamation on the one hand and its civil aspects on the other. Our argument is that disciplinary procedures by the Bar cannot and should not substitute libel suits, because. They have different goals and the interests represented in each of them are separate. Moreover, the option to impose disciplinary sanctions for defamation uttered during a hearing undermines the same rationale of the libel suit defense: keeping and protecting free speech in court.

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Zer-Gutman L., Katvan E. & Shnoor B., (2018) Honor and Respect, the Private and Professional among Lawyers, Din Udvarim 11, 457-500 (in Hebrew).